
The European continent is facing one of its most dangerous strategic turning points since the end of the Cold War. Pressure is no longer only coming from Russia to the east, but now it is also coming from the United States in the west. The current US National Security Strategy, published by Donald J. Trump, heralds a radical shift in the exercise of US power that is likely to leave Europe alone in the world.
Under the rubric of realism, this new approach represents a partial retreat from the traditional Washington position that functioned as the keel upon which the Atlantic security order leaned. It bluntly rejects the position that the United States serves to guarantee the world’s unipolarity and assumes the appearance of one great power intermixed with the masses. Its implications for Europe are immediate and disturbing.
America draws back from its post-Cold War persona
The NSS breaks radically from previous American strategic visions. This year’s document focused on great power competition against China and Russia and made alliances the core of American strength. The new_strategy reverses that and states that “the United States should respect the sovereignty of all non-security threats and concern itself only with countries that pose direct threats” to its national interests.
“It should concern itself only with countries that pose direct threats to its national interests.”
“Should respect the sovereignty of all non-security threats.”
This can go a long way in explaining why Moscow embraced the strategy. A statement by Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov characterized the strategy as having been “largely consistent” with the views of Russia. Simply on its own, this is an indicator of how much the US stance on this issue had shifted.
The language in Europe cannot be more plain. “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over,” declares the strategy, which insists that Europe must now “take primary responsibility for its own defense.” While it may not be unreasonable of the United States to demand more of the Europeans, how quickly and how abrasively this transition occurs are very problematic.
A world of spheres of influence returns
The significant element in the NSS is the implied validation of a spheres of influence global vision. This concept is much like the kind of politics practiced in the nineteenth-century Great Powers system, whereby the Great Powers exercised their domination in particular spheres of influence, and the other nations adapted to this fact.
For Washington, this also implies a return to a focus on the Western Hemisphere, reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine. In Asia, “balance of power” is the goal, rather than containment, in a relationship with a rising China. However, the result is destabilizing in Europe.
The spheres system corrodes the founding tenet of the transatlantic partnership: European and American security are indivisible. If Great Powers are able to accept each other’s dominance in their respective regions, smaller states are bargaining chips and not defended partners. Europe may turn into a buffer area and lose its role as a corner stone for world security.
Pressure from Russia and loss of engagement with US
Today, Europe is under pressure from both sides. To its east, there is the challenge posed by Russia, a “revisionist power” that seeks to achieve its ends through the use of force. The efforts by Moscow using cyber warfare, propaganda, and other forms of interference to divide Europe and make it easier for it to resist a “sphere of influence” are quite clear.
NSS apparently understates this risk. By pursuing visions of managing the expansion of NATO, seeking strategic stability with Russia, and pursuing enhanced economic cooperation, Washington is suggesting an intention to negotiate away security in Europe for present stability. Experience indicates that policies like these will only embolden further aggressive actions.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the Europeans face the challenge of American disengagement. This is due to the US signaling that they will transfer the task of conventional defense for Europe to Europeans themselves and maintain only the nuclear shield. This transition may start as from 2027.
The problem lies not in European responsibility per se, but rather in lack of preparation and cooperation. The NSS faults Europe’s economy, military budgets, and democracy while making threats of abandonment. It goes so far as to recommend “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory,” which includes political meddling to subvert the European Union.
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Why a weakened Europe is a problem for US interests
A weakened Europe is a strategically foolish thing for the USA. The European Union continues to be Washington’s only reliable ally regarding issues such as the stance towards China, regulating technology, sanctions, and a secure supply chain. A fragmented Europe can more easily be pressured by Beijing and manipulated by Moscow.
A spokesman for the European Commission explained that the proposed actions against Ukraine, which continues to be a pro Ironically, among Trump’s fiercest European political supporters, there are also those who are most assiduous in their Chinese accommodation.
A Balkanized Europe will come to terms with China instead of challenging it. Even in the likely less-liberal global environment, the US would still require Europe to lessen its dependence on Chinese rare earth, limit its access to hard disk semiconductors, and protect Taiwan against China’s ambitions. “Today, Europe has a stark choice to make. If it wishes to be relevant in world politics, it has to act as one in the framework of the European Union. None of its member-states can by itself replace the transatlantic relationship.” This is what Janusz Herczberg said at the opening of the Brookings-hosted conference on ‘Rebuilding Western Security in Turmoil: Trans-Atlantic Relationships.’ Caught between a re-emergent Russia and a retrenching America, Europe faces a choice between strategic maturation and marginality.