China has removed its most senior serving general, creating turmoil in the realm of security and defence within the country. The expulsion of General Zhang Youxia (previously Vice Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission – CMC) forces us to ask: Why is China destroying its own military leadership and command structures during a time when global tensions are on the rise?
It is likely that the answer has less to do with corruption and more to do with the way that power operates within the Chinese political system.
General Zhang (at age 75) was considered to be one of the most senior officers within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and had served as a close aide to Xi Jinping for many years. The departure of Zhang and many senior ranking commanders has resulted in the reduction of the CMC (the nation’s highest-level military decision maker) to only two members – Xi and one remaining member of the general command staff.
This situation represents an unprecedented situation in the history of the PLA. Analysts have described the top military management of the PLA as being very weak, with many senior ranks vacant and an increased concentration of political and military power with Xi.
While the official reports state that Zhang has been accused of “serious violations of discipline and law” (i.e. corruption), no specifics have been provided, and it is very likely that the reality of Zhang’s departure is more complex.
How to comprehend the PLA purge
Comprehending the purge, requires an understanding of what the PLA is, PLA is not a traditional national military. PLA is the armed division of the CCP.
Since the establishment of the CCP, a main principle has been that the Party commands the gun. Every unit of the PLA has Political Commissars while the senior commander in the PLA is embedded within the Party’s structure. Ultimately, loyalty to the Party will take precedence over a level of professionalism as a military officer or commander.
This design would make a Coup difficult, however, once the Party makes a Class Enemy of a high commander that commander has no institutional protection.
Patterns established by history
This is not the first time we have seen this happen in China, in 1971 the then Defence Minister Lin Biao, who was once the designated successor of Chairman Mao Zedong, was purged and ultimately died fleeing the country after allegedly attempting to carry out a Coup. Then in 1989, General Xu Qinxian refused to obey orders to use the PLA against the Civilian population at Tiananmen Square and was summarily arrested and sentenced to life in prison by the Party. In both cases, the PLA did not resist the orders of the Party, and it complied with them.
For years, the Chinese government has conveyed a single message: autonomy, doubt, or resistance to authority will be met with brutal suppression.
So why are they purging previous trusted commanders?
Xi Jinping has consolidated tremendous power; what is the rationale for purging senior officers who have been associated with Xi.
Analysts have identified two other key objectives.
The first is to prepare for conflict with external powers. Xi may be seeking to purge anyone who might not act as expected during a crisis involving Taiwan or the PLA and the United States.
The second objective is to prevent the PLA from developing into an independent institution. Xi’s continual purging of senior officer positions promotes an ongoing and event-hardened fear of Xi while developing loyalty and dependence on the commander-in-chief for the Senior Officer Corps.
In this type of political environment, competence can facilitate risks. A general with significant influence represents an increased risk of being considered a competitor for Xi.
Implications of the purge on China’s military power.
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What this means for China’s military power
The purge does not negatively impact the CCP’s objective to take Taiwan. That decision is made at the political level by the CCP, rather than the generals. However, the purge may change the way that military decisions are made.
Elimination of experienced commanders and creating a politically-heavily-pressured environment for other commanders likely results in decreased operational judgement. Xi will have more influence in the military’s decision-making process and fewer opportunities will exist for professional military debate on strategic issues.
In the near-term, Xi has improved his level of control. In the long-term, China’s military may be increasingly loyal to Xi; however, the military will lack flexibility, lack confidence and, ultimately, be more brittle.
This paradox exists in the centre of China’s current purge.
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